The Evolution of Cognition follows three other recent books (Balda et al. 1998; Dukas 1998; Shettleworth 1998) devoted to the evolutionary ecology of animal cognition. Is this flood of new books justified? Cognition is best defined as the neuronal processes concerned with the acquisition and manipulation of information by animals. Like any other biological characteristic, cognition has been subjected to evolution by natural selection, meaning that genetically based variation in cognitive abilities among individuals is associated with variation in survival and reproduction. That variation translates into changes in gene frequencies and their associated cognitive traits over generations. Compared with anatomical and morphological traits, cognition has not yet been subjected to the intense evolutionary and ecological research it deserves given its central role in animal life. Hence the four recent books on the evolutionary ecology of cognition are timely contributions setting the stage for the necessary investigation.
The Evolution of Cognition is visually appealing, well edited and includes numerous detailed cross-references among chapters, suggesting that the authors spent their time well at the workshop at the Konrad Lorenz Institute, where this volume was conceived. The 19 contributions are organized into five sections, each introduced with a brief overview, which adds to the coherence of the volume. The first section, Orientations, contains introductory chapters on conceptual and methodological issues. The section on Categorization deals with how animals classify and represent information. The Causality section focuses on relationships between events, objects and individuals. Chapters in the Consciousness section deal with consciousness as well as insight and episodic memory. Finally, the Culture section includes discussions on the effect of social interactions and culture on cognition. As the section headings suggest, this volume differs from the other three recent books on the same topic by focusing on issues of particular interest to primatologists and animal psychologists.
Perhaps owing to my own cognitive bias, I found the chapter on scrub jay memory by Clayton et al. the most interesting. Research on spatial memory in birds has focused on species that depend on food items they cache for future retrieval from memorized locations. Inspired by evolutionary principles, this research has documented that species that depend on memorized food caches show better spatial memory abilities than closely related noncaching species, and that the hippocampus, the brain part involved in spatial memory, is larger in caching than noncaching species. The main focus of the research on spatial memory has been on 'where' food items are cached. In addition to spatial location, however, information about 'what' and 'when' food has been cached may have fitness value. For example, perishable insect larvae must be recovered from caches within a short time, but nonperishable peanuts may be recovered after a longer period. Clayton et al. review their recent elegant experiments documenting that scrub jays indeed are able to remember and adaptively use the 'what' and 'when' information.
In another interesting chapter, Tomasello presents two hypotheses about cognitive skills unique to primates and humans. The first hypothesis is that, among animals, only primates can form categories of relationships among external entities. An example of using such information in the social domain is redirected aggression, in which individual a attacks individual b, and individual b retaliates by attacking c, who is a relative of a. This hypothesis about primate uniqueness may be falsified by testing for similar cognitive ability in nonprimates.
The second hypothesis is that, among primates, only humans perceive the causal and intentional relations among external entities. A social example is a well controlled documentation that, after watching individual a hiding food, the focal subject prefers to ask for food from individual a rather than individual b. Another example is 'intentional' teaching, which Tomasello argues is a prerequisite for social learning and the development of culture. The hypothesis about human uniqueness and its effect on culture is open to debate. First, as Tomasello discusses, some researchers believe that nonhuman primates can understand causal/intentional relations among external entities, a notion that may be substantiated with further evidence. Second, it is not obvious why we should assume that intentional teaching led to social learning rather than the feasible alternative that improved communication and social learning led to understanding of third-party intentions. To resolve these issues, we must generate and test explicit predictions.
It will probably take years before a book named The Evolution of Cognition can provide a thorough analysis of the evolutionary ecology of cognitive traits. Even so, this volume and the similar recent books convey a sound message that is sure to inspire biologically informed research on the evolutionary ecology of cognition. To this end, researchers well trained in modern biology, particularly evolutionary ecology, physiology, development and neurobiology, should keep on addressing a wide range of cognitive abilities in various animals including relatively noncomplex, small-brained species. Such research is likely to continue to reveal that many animals possess sophisticated cognitive skills allowing them to survive and reproduce in their particular niches. Understanding the adaptive significance of and mechanisms underlying such abilities, which may seem as unique as the ones expressed by humans, will help us acquire an unbiased, mature view of the evolutionary ecology of animal cognition.
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